

PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNION IN THE FORMATION OF NEW PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS THROUGH PERCEPTIVE FILES, RELEVANCE, CAUSAL LINKS AND QUALIAS IN THE PHENOMENAL PHYSICAL COHESION OF EMPLOYABILITY IN THE EXPERIENCES WITNESSED

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Abstract: The present study describes the possibility of “phenomenal unification” laws acting on a variety of phenomena acquired during experiences lived over time, capable of generating a new phenomenal concept through the files maintained in latent flow in the perceptive storage when exposed to the phenomenological unification processes by a sense of reference. Such references would assume a force of relevance through a correspondence with the contents of the property links, by the causal links and substantial knowledge that are part of the characteristics of the object in the experience. In addition, the sense of the force of relevance can be driven by a network of experienced sensations or qualia integrated into the context of related experiences that are fundamental for the formation of the new phenomenal meaning. Thus, we question whether the new phenomenological concepts would establish a physical-phenomenal cohesion with the other phenomenal concepts and their causal links that are in the same context of experience, even without a priori knowledge of the employability of this new concept.

Keywords: phenomenal unification, causal links, qualia, phenomenal concepts

Phenomenology is the study of the "phenomena" that appear to consciousness, of what is

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"given" and demarcates the recognition of a "nexus of horizons", ambiguities and differences. This presence is structured by a series of relationships grounded in aspects of the physical world, such as bonding, property, spatial and temporal relations, adding an understanding of what intrinsically characterizes perceptions, judgments, feelings, decisions, etc. (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2020; Lyotard, 1991; Cimino, 2018)

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), in founding and bringing the first studies on phenomenology, describes as "the things in themselves" the way in which the world comes to be experienced within the various situations that are significant for all actions and attempts to obtain knowledge. The significant experiences that make up these contexts were described by Husserl as "external horizons" and have their relations of mutual implication with the course of life or sense of the world, also called by him "natural attitude" (Husserl, 1950/1964, 1983).

This sense of the world establishes a background basis or a reference relationship for the understanding of the lived experience of reality, forming the structure that impacts the direction of decisions and choices while applying a force of reorganization to the knowledge already witnessed.

In this sense, we follow the proposal of some authors (Sokolowski, 2000; Perry, 2001) in observing the phenomenological issues united in experience and their relationship with perception in the most complicated forms of consciousness, such as memory, imagination and intellection.

For idealism, the material world is dependent on a phenomenological structure capable of "weaving" meanings from the sensory experiences of colors, shapes, sounds, smells, sizes, etc., unified in the relationship of unity of consciousness (Chappell, 2018).

The unity of consciousness addresses all experiences in a single reality, and so, for idealism, the relationships that structure reality are phenomenal relationships. In Balog (2012) phenomenal experiences are constituents of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal concepts carry with them the phenomenology of experience. In this way, knowledge is linked to these concepts that offer the vision of essence in phenomenal experience.

The theory of perception and imagination describe these experiences of reality linked by

"phenomenal unification laws." They would enable the union of physical reality and the mind of the observer, generating phenomenology that, in some sense, reflects the world (Chappell, 2024).

Perceptions and imaginations are parts of phenomenal experiences and metaphysical nature. In the case of perception, they have to deal with their own aspects of the material world and, at the same time, they are related by the unity of consciousness. For O'Callaghan (2019), perception intimately integrates the knowledge of the human subject with the environment. In Noë (2001), perceptual consciousness has a significant involvement with the environment that makes us ready and able to acquire information as the need arises.

The way imagination acts on phenomenal experiences is distinct from reality. Considered as "sui generis" or mind-generated experiences. They are also phenomenally unified with the conscious mental states that make it possible to grasp the data of the physical world's experience.

In both cases, the external relations between the object and the rest of reality are what differentiate perceptions and imagination. These external relations make possible the knowledge of experience that needs to maintain a "property link" with certain aspects of reality so that they present themselves as expanding objects. This expansion makes it possible to incorporate part of the phenomenology that comprises reality.

In this sense, if idealists can offer a unified view of knowledge that explains both introspective and perceptual knowledge, would it be possible for these processes to act on a wide range of phenomena obtained in contexts and experiences witnessed? Phenomena that would be stored and maintained under a perceptual flow dependent on a state of relevance that connects them by a central essence, causing a new conceptual phenomenon to result from this unification and be integrated into the context of real experience.

The concepts that result from the phenomenological union can occur through an expansion of the connections of properties, keeping with them what belongs to the most central aspects of the thing, its phenomenal meaning, while at the same time seeking to achieve greater clarity and coherence with the other aspects of the experience witnessed.

The phenomena that can serve as the basis for these processes would be kept in a type of storage similar to what was indicated in Perry (2001). From this perspective, in order for a phenomenal concept to be formed, it is necessary that the phenomenon fills a perceptual file and is linked to a separate notion.

In the present study, we suggest that a variety of phenomena may be in latent flux in perceptual storage and that they are brought to the processes of phenomenological unification through a sense of reference, transferring the phenomena in a state of latency in perceptual storage to higher-level concepts.

Following this proposal, perceptual storage would receive phenomena that have an "insufficiency" relationship with the perceptual apparatus, and thus provide a weak recognition of the experienced content. This insufficiency can generate phenomena that would not be registered in the perceptual structure in a relevant way, being temporarily placed in what Perry called the "perceptual buffer". This storage would occur at a lower or unconscious level that also refers to what Chappell (2017) described as "constituted archive".

The temporary low-level reservoir would be responsible for maintaining the various types of "insufficient" phenomena until they can be attached to a concept at the higher level, which are those consciously elaborated.

Some authors (Carruthers, 1996; Rosenthal, 1986; Lycan, 1987) indicate the existence of a difference between conscious and non-conscious mental states that occur due to a condition of presence or absence of relevance. The sense of consciousness that we have discussed here refers to a low-level and higher-level "phenomenal consciousness."

The concepts witnessed at the higher level would be related in the perceptual archive by relevance through a correspondence with the content of the property connection, the causal links and substantial knowledge that are part of the characteristics of the object in experience, in didactic learning and in its relationship with other phenomena. They would establish some relevance to the unification process in the phenomenal new concept.

However, there is still a fundamental condition for this whole process to be in relation to the formation of the new phenomenal concept. They can be the conductors that point out the criteria of relevance to the laws of phenomenological unification and their relationship with the contents of the phenomena stored at lower levels. Qualias can establish some kind of physical-phenomenal tension and cohesion, leading to the joining of phenomena that were incongruous to come together to create a new meaning, offering content for rational insights that go beyond the mere presence of an old memory of facts.

Based on this conjecture, it would be possible for the laws of phenomenological unification to act on several phenomena filed in a low-perceptual level flow, unifying these phenomena through a central essence to a new phenomenological concept that encompasses a perspective that completes the experience of reality through its relations of mutual implications with the "external horizons", even without a priori knowledge of their employability?

To exemplify this model, we have as a basis of assumption the example of Mary's case in the argument from knowledge in (Jackson 1982). Throughout Mary's life, she had access to information about colors, physics, and neurology. However, she was raised from birth in a black and white room and the only way for her to obtain this information that filled her substantial knowledge was through textbooks and computers with all their content kept in black and white. Thus, she knew all the general physical facts about the processing of vision, light, and colors, even though she was unable during her lifetime to have any experience with other colors in the physical world.

Now imagine that the color red is introduced to Mary for the first time. She has access to the phenomenal new concept of what this new experience is like, and she registers the red concept of the physical world in her perceptual file. In addition, phenomenal red also begins to be part of his imaginative repertoire and becomes available to the laws of phenomenological unification.

Although Mary possesses her repertoire of substantial knowledge acquired from books and computers during her life as a recluse, the newfound phenomenal red still lacks a considerable amount of property connections and other concepts that relate to real experiences. Such a condition is also

limiting for greater connectivity with the causal link of this network of phenomenal concepts in experience.

Suppose this study continues and Mary gets a free pass to leave both her room black and white, as well as access to books and computers without color restrictions. With her recent experience of red discovered in the physical world added to the content learned in the books, she leaves the room and starts to circulate around the laboratory building openly. The researchers include images, pictures, objects, and computers with a specific line of property relationships and causal links, scattered throughout the places Mary can circulate. All the while she is exposed to a variety of concepts that intertwine with a series of phenomenal meanings associated with the color red.

For example, in one of the corridors of the building, Mary comes across a photo on the wall of a beautiful girl in a red dress receiving a red rose from the hand of a man. Right ahead, she sees two more paintings with objects, in the first there is a bottle of red wine and a box with fine chocolates wrapped by a bow containing the word seduction in red, in the second frame a red sports car being appreciated by people at a car show.

After that, Mary sits in front of a computer and watches some scenes with necklaces and ruby rings in demonstration. Red shines on each jewel in the seductive movements that a beautiful girl makes when she appears wearing these jewels on a stage. You can see how the glow of the intense red makes this material valuable for this purpose and makes the audience desire deeply connected by the need to have its presence with them.

During the next few years, Mary lives with rewarding experiences of the type that covers more knowledge related to behaviors, styles, trends, customs, skills, research, etc. She obtains a variety of concepts and experiences that form part of her phenomenal perceptual imagery while maintaining the essence of the experiences of the color red.

We can observe the relationship of this structure in formation by the contents experienced through the perspective treated in Husserl's genetic phenomenology, which addresses the issue of the emergence of these phenomena and how some types of experiences tend to influence and motivate

other experiences. They form a repertoire of experienced content and a structure of cultural meanings that generates an intersubjective lifeworld that expands on real experiences.

These interactions with perceptual content and motivations or influence for other experiences follow an alignment with the proposal of the current work. Just as an intentional model that precedes explicit synthesis and serves as the basis for thoughts, decisions and the formation of judgments is also a relevant part of genetic phenomenology. This model, Husserl calls "passive synthesis". The function of passive synthesis occurs in perceptual contents following psychological "rules of association" such as perceptual prominence, similarity, contrast, and heterogeneity.

In Donohoe (2014), he points out the way in which an individual's intersubjectivity is formed through layers of personal and cultural experiences, leading to the understanding and experiences of the world. Through experiences, the "layers" would be sedimented and form repertoires of meanings that offer meaning to the world. In addition, sedimentation can also be inherited from previous generations and from their own experiences and, in this sense, what applies to genetic phenomenology can act based on its internal contents sedimented before a conscious action directed to analysis or reflection on its horizon of experience.

The associated role of past experiences in phenomenology is also described in Detmer (2013), who describes a genetic component that is concerned with origins and that supports meaning. This meaning requires time to be structured, just as the horizon of experience also requires its part in the evolution of public, subjective, and personal meanings in an individual's psychic life. The more he continually encounters certain phenomena throughout his life, the more his understanding of the meaning of the phenomena becomes deeper and more enriched.

The experiences that Mary witnesses continue to provide phenomena layered by a network of causalities that add more substantial knowledge base, as well as support property links and provide more relevance of connectivity with a causal link that are part of the phenomenological essence of the concepts of experience witnessed.

In this way, Mary has a variety of phenomena recorded over a long period of time sedimented

in her perceptual archives. We would need to know now whether these phenomenological contents in the flow of records at lower levels can constitute a certain relevance and connectivity to the laws of phenomenal connections and their causal links, preserving an initial phenomenological essence in the formation of a new phenomenon coherent with their experience of reality.

Now let's assume that Mary, after having access to any study department in the laboratory building, she got to know the chemistry department that was working on a new perfume fragrance. Upon receiving a sample of the fragrance, she felt an interesting sense of affinity, attraction, esteem and achievement. Such a state activated some level of detection related to the phenomena obtained over the years with his experience with the color red. Phenomena filed in her "perceptual buffer" or "constitutive archive" obtained every time she walked through the corridors of the institution and came across images and scenes attributed to the color red. These physical experiences also generated sensations recorded in Mary's perceptual archives such as seduction, admiration, desire, sophistication, attraction, fascination and conquest, constituting the qualias.

Qualias are essentially parts of an experimenter's experience and can serve as a subject's mental constituent basis (Chappell, 2019). In Arıcı and Toy (2015), they define qualias as "what it is like to be in a state". These states refer to qualitative aspects of the subject or distinct subjective sensations indicated by certain mental states, similar to redness of the red experience.

The sensations Mary experienced for years in her experiments with images and scenes related to the color red formed a reservoir based on what O'Callaghan (2019) describes as "multisensory qualias" that apparently became eligible items and connected to the sensations experienced when feeling the seductive fragrance of a future perfume.

According to Lewis (1995), qualias are capable of offering abilities to recognize, judge, and imagine experiences of the same type and differences. They are also linked to the criteria of pleasure, acceptance, disgust, etc., of an experience and can be apprehended by experiencing them.

Even if there is a perceptual distance between a color and an aroma, relevance arises from the relationship of the causal and directing link with the experiences where qualias participate in

this process forming a relatable eligible detection link. In Mary's case, attraction and desire were represented in order to establish links with the phenomena obtained through the (seductive) scenes and images of the color red.

Thus, it is probable that the laws of phenomenological unification, through the linking devices, act with the archived phenomena of experiences over time. This phenomenological content can be retrieved and driven by certain types of qualias in a direction of relevance to the causal link. Consequently, this process enables a structure for the expansion of the phenomenological concept that encompasses the content within the scope of experience.

However, would it be possible that this formation of a new phenomenal concept already possesses an a priori knowledge of its employability, establishing a physical-phenomenal cohesion with the other phenomenal concepts and their causal links that are in the same context of experience?

We approach this question through the difference between a priori conceptual analysis and a posteriori inspection of concepts. This difference occurs in the understanding of the knowledge in its inspection, which are different from the knowledge acquired through their use (Chappell, 2017).

If we follow this pattern, the knowledge acquired by Mary, through her a priori conceptual analysis, has different characteristics from when this concept is employed in the context of experience, which would provide access to the physical-phenomenal knowledge of the causal links of the new phenomenon obtained in the process of unification.

Causal links belong to phenomena, but they assume a force of presence or certainty detached in the connections that these phenomena are obliged to maintain in their employability in the context of their experiences. A force of mutual implication that maintains a certain tension that shapes the knowledge of coherence between facts and concepts through the relevance of the phenomenon in the line that follows the experience itself. According to Perry (2001), we know things by the properties they instantiate and by the relationships they maintain with other things. In Bannon, (2016), he observes the relevance of understanding the relationship with the world and how phenomena arise, making room for new phenomena in experience.

Let's now say that Mary, after thinking about the experience of smelling a fragrance and her good sense of desirability, has a rational insight and stipulates, in her imagination, how much she could contribute to the research and the expansion of her knowledge that was acquired during the years of attending the laboratory and being part of the research. This sense of expanding knowledge is reinforced by what Bannon (2016) describes about the intensification of experiences as phenomena become numerous and erupt in superabundance. During the long process of acquiring perceptual content, the process of expansion forms spaces and niches that serve as new structures for other experiences.

Following the same direction, there is yet another type of relation of intensification that could "force" new phenomenal relations, similar to what (Sokolowski, 2000) describes as the intentionality of the "absent thing". An intention that intends to fill a missing concept or image. Like a state of searching for something not yet found and that needs a series of intermediate and necessary steps until finally the object itself is reached. This relationship may occur because certain kinds of missing things are considered achievable in the future, because they are beyond our comprehension in the present moment.

The approach of the missing thing in Mary becomes understandable when she reassembles situations that fit her presence of experience. Like imagining your own fragrance in a perfume and helping the designer's development of colors, images, packaging layout and promotion. Many of these rationalized insights come from the perceptual and imaginative fusion of the constituted records that receive relevance through the qualities experienced, such as desire and admiration, witnessed throughout the time of their experience with the color red and its network of causal relationships.

In addition, Mary also deals with perceptual signals that stimulate her action and creation that can lead to changes in the structure of thought in its interaction with the experiential contents. This fact fits what Lyotard (1991) points out as "episodic". In the formation of a new phenomenal concept of experience, the sense of episodic can be present and carry with it multiplicities and variations of its existence in reality. A sense of transition in constant transformation that observes the need to connect,

make connections and perceive its variations and other forms.

If Mary employs her plan to create and develop her perfume brand, her designer with all the characteristics that are linked to her seductive experiences of wonder, desire, sophistication and attraction, she forms access to a kind of knowledge that encompasses the "episodic" sense that can be driven into the very employability of the expanding phenomenon. An a posteriori knowledge that maintains a relationship adjacent to causal links in the direction with experience and the other phenomena that compose it.

The new phenomenal concept in his experience crosses the distance that was maintained in his perceptual archive during phenomenological unification to its relation to the essence obtained in real experiences. Through this, Mary would be able to perceive a greater phenomenological physical cohesion that can only be known through the experiences of her performance when it is performed (Merleau-Ponty, 2013).

Thus, Mary has access to the tensions that involve the phenomena of unification and to her a priori conceptual analysis in the confrontation with her own experience and causal links that also make up the phenomena involved in the experience. In addition, it reestablishes an evaluation connection with the qualias of past experiences in its new phenomenological framework. This whole process of knowledge and its employability in the search for a greater phenomenal physical coherence observed in Mary's case, establishes the fundamental meaning of what the study of phenomenology tries to do: "to go to what is really experienced by the individual who judges" (Lyotard, 1991).

This sense also maintains conformity with the objectives of phenomenology that is indicated in Detmer (2013) which seeks to establish a descriptive fidelity with a greater precision of what is given in experience within the limits of how it is witnessed, integrating the fundamental structures of conscious experience.

In Gallagher (2020), he describes the study of phenomenology in perception not as an exclusively subjective phenomenon, but as this whole process is experienced by an observer who is in the world, and who is also an embodied agent with motivations and purposes.

Ultimately, we observe that the whole process of unification and its employability does not refer exclusively to phenomenal experiences, but also characterizes them in terms of what it is like to have them in a network of causal links that make them more physically and phenomenologically cohesive, preserving the most central aspects of their phenomenal meaning that comprises the "as it is" of a conscious episode (Nagel 1974; O'Callaghan, 2019).

Conclusion

The present work describes the possibility of the laws of phenomenological unification acting in the formation of a new concept using a variety of phenomena acquired in the experiments over a long period of time and recorded in a low-level and higher-level perceptual file. The processes involving the laws of phenomenological unification would occur through a sense of reference that would use the content of the property bond, causal links and substantial knowledge.

We indicate the possibility that this relevance is driven by a network of experienced sensations or qualias integrated into the context of related experiences, favoring the formation of the new phenomenal meaning. However, the a posteriori knowledge of its physical-phenomenal cohesion is marked by the difference between the inspection and its application of the phenomenological concept in relation to other concepts in experience. Thus, the employability of the new concept is an essential part to incorporate phenomenological knowledge that comprises an effective and functional cohesion in the relationships it maintains in the networks of causal links and its result in the experience of reality, making it possible to form new structures for the expansion of new phenomenal concepts.

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